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CASE NOTES
petition by the defendants in the Goduto case. Therefore, the point in
issue is whether or not the Illinois state courts can convict the defendants
of trespass without a prior determination by the National Labor Relations
Board of their right to be on the property. Because the defendants did not
follow the procedure established by Congress to protect their rights, the
Illinois Supreme Court held that they could exercise jurisdiction. This
seems to be the logical decision, for to deny the jurisdiction of the states
because of the unions' failure to apply for a determination of its rights
would make the states' interest in the prevention of violence subject to the
course of action decided upon by the labor union. The cases have re-
peatedly held that the states' interest in the safety of the public and pre-
vention of violence is predominant.""
Therefore, the Illinois courts properly took jurisdiction over the acts
of the defendants in the Goduto case because their repeated refusals con-
stituted a threat of violence to the community. Furthermore, although the
Illinois state courts did not have the power to determine whether or not
the defendants' trespass was excused under section 7 of the National Labor
Relations Act, the defendants were properly convicted because of their
failure to apply to the National Labor Relations Board for a determination
of their rights. This follows since the rights of the states to control vio-
lence have been held to take precedence over rights granted labor unions
in section 7.39 It was the course of action decided upon by the labor
union which created the situation where their rights under section 7
could not be determined. It would be incongruous to find that the state's
interest in the protection of the public was subject to the course of action
decided upon by the labor unions, since the states have a duty to protect
the peace and order of society.40
88 United Constr. Workers v. Laburnum Constr. Corp., 347 U.S. 656 (1954); United
Auto. Workers v. WERB, 351 U.S. 266 (1956); Youngdahl v. Rainfair Co., 355 U.S.
131 (1957).
89 Ibid.
40 A petition for certiorari in the case of People v. Goduto is presently pending
before the United States Supreme Court. 30 U.S.L. Week 3097 (U.S. Sept. 22, 1961)
(No. 437).
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-SAFETY RESPONSIBILITY LAW
AS A DEPRIVATION OF DUE PROCESS
The defendant, a resident of Colorado, was involved in an automobile
accident while driving within the state. Within a one year period after
the first accident, the defendant was involved in a second in which he was
charged with driving while under a license suspension order issued by the
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Colorado Motor Vehicle .Department.. The trial court found that the de,.
fendant'& driver's license had been summarily revoked after the first acci-
dent pursuant to the Colorado, Safety Responsibility Law.' The Colorado
SupremeCobrt held that the statute which allows revocation of a dtiverls
license without prior hearing or trial, .is unconstitutional as a violation!..of
due process. People v. Nothaus, 363 P.2d 180 (Colo. 1961). .:- . . :
The Colorado statute states .that any person involved tin a motor vehicle
accident in the State ofColorado is required to filewith-the. Motor Vehi-
cle Division of the Department of Revenue a full, report .of ,what oc-
curred. 2 The report must be submitted by all .parties.. regardless of fault.
The Director of Revenue is required. to suspend the license of every
operator, and the vehicle registration. of every -owner who was "in any
manner involved ' 3 in the* accident.t Suspension may be avoided where the
party involved in the accident, regardless, of liability, deposits security or
has liability ,insurance referred to inthe,.statute as "sufficient in. the judg-
ment of the Director to satisfy any., judgments for damages from such
accidents as may be recovered against such operator. or owner. "4
The statute, not unique to Colorado, has been enacted with slight -mod-
ifications in. forty-two other states 5 The underlying purpose has been to
protect citizens from financially irresponsible drivers, on the highway.. In
all instances such statutes have been held to be constitutional and not vi-
olative of due process. The Louisiana Appellate; Court, in Sharp v. :De-
partment of Public SafetyO where a driver'slicense was revoked under a
I COLO. REV. STAT. art 7, 13-7-1 to 131-7-39 (1953).
2 COLO. REV. STAT. art. 7,§ 13-7-6 (1953).
3 COLo. REV. STAT. art. 7,§ 13-7-7 (1953).
4 Ibid.
5 For example: CODE OF ALA. tit. 36, '§§ 74(42-'83) (1958); CAL. CODE ANN.Vehi. le
Code, Div. 7, ch. 1, §§ 16000-16503 (Deering, 1959); CONN.GEN. STAT. tit. 14, § 1']-
281 (1958); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 221, §§ 2901-2972 (1953); FLA. STAT. ch. 324.011-324.271
(1959); IDAHO CODE ch. 15, §§ 49-1501 to 49-1540 (1957); IND. STAT. §§ 47-1044:t 1051
(Burns 1952); IOWA CODE ANN. ch..,312A,. 9§ 1-38 (1949); Ky. REv..STAT...ch. 187,
§ 290-990 (1960); REV. STAT. OF ME. ch. 19, }§ 64-71 (1944).;..CoMP. LAW OF.,MICH.
ch. 256.251-256.269 (1948); MINN. STAT. ch. 170, §§ i70.21-170.57 (1957); Mo. REV.
STAT. ch. 303, §§ 303.010-303.340 (1949); REV. CODE OF MONT. tit. 53, ch. 4, §§ 53.401 to
53-458 (1947); CONSOL. LAWS OF N.Y. ANN. V and T, art. 6, §§ 310-321 (1960); NEV.
REV. STAT. ch. 485, §§ 485.010-485.420 (1960); N.C. GEN. STAT. ch. 20, art. 9, §§ 20-224 to
20-279 (1953); OKLA. REV. STAT. tit. 47, ch. 14, §9 501-542 (1951); ORE. REV. STAT. tit.
39, ch * 486, §§ 486.001486.991 (1959);.PA.' STAT.-'.:AN'N.. tit. 75, art. .14, §§-1401-1436
(Purdons 1960); GEN. LAW OF R..I. tit.'31 ,ch. 31,. §§ 31-31-1 to 31-31.-22 (1956); TEX.
STAT. art. 6701h, SS 1-43 (Vernon 1952); UTAH CODE ANN. tit. 41, ch. 12, §§ 41-12-1 to
41-12-41 (1953); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 23, ch. 11, §§ 801-921 (1959); CODE OF VA. tit. 4:6.1,
eh. 6, §§ 46.1-388 to 514 (1950); W.VA. CODE.OF 1955 ANN. ch. 17D,.art. 1-3, §§ 1721-
482 to 539; Wis. STAT. ANN. ch. 344.01-.52 (1958); Wyo.'STAT..tit. 31,.ch. 6, §§ 31-277
to-315 (1957). • . . . .. ", ,
0114 S.2d 121 (La. 1959).
CASE NOTES
safety responsibility statute similar to the 'one involved in the Nothaus
case, rejected the plaintiff's view that the act was unconstitutional. The
court stated that "the constitutionality of such license suspension provi-
sions [has] been upheld without exception." 7. .
The Supreme Court of Colorado found the statute unconstitutional on
two points, first that it was a violation of due process, and second, that it
was not a proper exercise of the police power of the state. The majority.
of the court was aware of the fact that they could not cite any cases to
support its decision, despite the fact that the Nothaus case is in no man-
ner a case of first impression.
The court first sustained the plaintiff's argument on the theory that the
effect of the enforcement of the statute causes a deprivation of property
without due process. of law.8 The court stated, "'[f]he term property.
within the due process clause includes the right to make full'use of the
property which one has, an inalienable right to acquire."9 The decision
went on to state that when a citizen meets the standards of fitness- and
competence set down by the state, necessary to obtain a driver's license,
he thereby acquires the right to drive upon the highway until, by due
process of law and in the interest of public safety, he is deprived of it.
"The question of whether A constitutionally guaranteed property right
can be denied for some justifiable reason, is essentially a judicial question
"710.
Consideration must be given to the"Colorado decision for its holding
that drivers' licenses embrace a property right. The courts of many states
have drawn a distinction between licenses which are entitled to the con-
stitutional guarantees ,,afforded rights and licenses which are given the
status of privileges. The courts have usually held that licenses regarding
alcohol, driving, dance halls, pool rooms, theaters, fishermen, and pop-
corn stands to be within the concept of privileges. Licenses afforded the
constitutional guarantees given rights are those concerned with the more
dignified callings such as law, medicine; architecture and accounting."
The Colorado court in granting drivers' licenses constitutional guarantees
gives an entirely new insight to the status of drivers' licenses.
Contrary to the Colorado holding thata driver's license is a property
right, a leading case in this area is Goodwin v. Yavapai County. 12 In this
case thi" plaintiff claimed that his driver's, license, which was summarily re-
7 Id: at 123.
8 People v. Nothaus, 363 P.2d 180 (Co. 1961).
9 Id. at 182.
1o Id. at 182. ,(Emphasis added.) ..
11 DAvis, Ciss ON ADMINISTRATtVE LAW 162 (1959).
12 68 Ariz. 108, 20)1 P.2d 124 (1948).-.
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yoked after he pleaded guilty to a drunken driving charge, was a property
right. The court held that a driver's license was not a property right.
A license to operate a motor vehicle is not a contract or property right, but
a mere privilege, the enjoyment of which depends upon compliance with the
conditions prescribed by the state and is subject to its control. 18
Prior to the Colorado decision, all courts have held that a driver's li-
cense represents a privilege and does not in any legal or constitutional
sense amount to property. Revocation has been held not to be a depriva-
tion of property without due process of law.14 To operate an auto is not
a natural right, nor does a license represent a property right. Licenses may
be suspended or revoked without opportunity to be heard.15
Secondly, the Colorado Supreme Court held that this statute cannot be
enforced within the police power of the state. In its decision the court
stated that any limitation on a validly licensed driver must be based on a
proper exercise of police power to protect the public health, safety and
welfare. 16 The majority continued, saying that to compel the deposit of
security or the showing that one has financial responsibility to indemnify
another against financial loss, has nothing to do with the protection of the
public health, safety and welfare. "The public gets no protection what-
ever from the deposit of such security,"'1 7 and thus the Colorado court
concluded that the Safety Responsibililty Law is not a valid statute under
the exercise of the state police power.
The courts of many states have uniformly held contrary, asserting that
the purpose of such a safety responsibility statute is to protect the public
against the operation of motor vehicles by reckless and irresponsible per-
sons. i8 The theory expressed in the instant case is refuted by Escobedo v.
131d. at 115, 201 P.2d at 128.
14 Hadden v. Aitken, 156 Neb. 215, 55 N.W.2d 620 (1952); State v. LaPlante, 47 R.I.
258, 131 At. 641 (1926).
15 Nulter v. State, 119W. Va. 312, 193 SE. 549 (1937).
16 People v. Nothaus, 363 P.2d 180 (Colo. 1961).
17 Id. at 183.
18 Reitz v. Mealy, 314 U.S. 33 (1941); Ex Parte Poresky, 290 U.S. 30 (1933); Sprout
v. City of South Bend, 27 U.S. 163 (1928); State v. Price, 49 Ariz. 19, 63 P.2d 653 (1937);
Escobedo v. State Department, 35 Cal.2d 870, 222 P.2d 1 (1950); Ballow v. Reeves, 238
S.W.2d 141 (Ky. 1951); In Re Opinion of the Justices, 251 Mass. 569, 147 N.E. 681
(1925); DeVries v. Alger, 329 Mich. 68, 44 N.W.2d 872 (1950); Surtman v. Secretary of
State, 309 Mich. 270, 15 N.W.2d 471 (1944); Ragland v. Wallace, 80 Ohio App. 210, 70
N.E.2d 118 (1946); In Re Opinion of the Justices, 81 N.H. 566, 129 At. 117 (1925);
Garford Trucking Co. v. Hoffman, 114 N.J.L. 522, 177 Ad. 882 (1935); Heart v.
Fletcher, 184 Misc. 659, 53 N.Y.S.2d 369 (1945); Sullins v. Butler, 175 Tenn. 468, 135
S.W.2d 930 (1940); Gillaspie v. Department of Public Safety, 152 Tex 459, 259 S.W.2d
177 (1953); Prichard v. Battle, 178 Va. 455, 17 S.E.2d 393 (1941); Nulter v. State, 119
W.Va. 312, 193 SE. 549 (1937); State v. Stehlek, 262 Wis. 642, 56 N.W.2d 514 (1953).
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State.19 In that case the plaintiff, whose license was revoked under an al-
most identical financial responsibility law of California, pleaded that it
was more in the public interest that he should be able to drive his truck
and support his nine children, than it was to keep him, a financially irre-
sponsible driver, off the highway. Escobedo further contended that in
fact this law did not meet the compelling public interest. The court held
that such a law did meet the public interest saying that, "the compelling
public interest here appears from the obvious carelessness and financial
irresponsibility of a substantial number of drivers .... ,,2o To establish
such a safety responsibility law is a power inherent in every sovereign
government.2 1 Safety responsibility statutes are within the police power
of the state, and may be enacted in conformance with constitutional lim-
its.2 2 Where a driver's license was revoked under a similar and earlier
safety responsibility law, in spite of the plea that the law was not in the
interest of the general welfare, the court in Rosenblum v. Griffin23 held
that such a law was reasonable and proper.
[P]rotection for securing redress for injured highway travelers is a proper
subject for police regulation, as well as protection from being injured. It is a
reasonable incident of the general welfare that financially irresponsible persons
be denied the use of the highway.... 24
In the dissenting opinion two justices stated that to enable one "to roam
the highway in search of a second accident" 25 is precluded by this type of
Safety Responsibility statute. Although this argument has merit it does
not apply to the innocent driver who is involved in an accident without
fault. The minority of the court argued that the great weight of authority
has held contra to this decision, but this argument is of no value if in all
prior decisions basic consitutional guarantees have been overlooked. The
Colorado court has taken the lead in attempting, and perhaps justifiably
so, to create a property right in the area of drivers' licensing. It can be
hoped that the court's rationale for this decision is a realization of basic
constitutional rights and not a desire to influence the legislature to enact
more stringent financial responsibility laws.
19 35 Cal.2d 870, 222 P.2d 1 (1950).
20 Id. at 876, 222 P.2d at 5. In California there were 3,879,931 motor vehicles in 1950.
In the first four months after the act, 19,808 drivers were ordered to establish adequate
security, and 6,576 licenses were suspended under the law.
21 Doyle v. Kahl, 242 Iowa 153, 46 N.W.2d 52 (1951).
22 Hadden v. Aitken, 156 Neb. 215, 55 N.W.2d 620 (1952).
23 89 N.H. 314, 197 Atl. 701 (1938).
24 Id. at 318, 197 Atl. at 704.
25 People v. Nothaus, 363 P.2d 180, 184 (Colo. 1961).
